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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:
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Post Office Box 11808 Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone

41993

VIA HAND-DELIVERY

Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks, Plaintiffs/Appellants v, Roy B. Moore: Elaine B. Weis; and The Department
of Financial Institutions of Utah, Defendants/Appellees,
Case No. 920703-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Appellants Kent L. Brown ("Brown") and Larry R. Hendricks
("Hendricks"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby
object and respond to the letter dated February 26, 1993 by
counsel for Appellees sent to the Court after oral argument (held
February 17, 1993), purportedly to advise of new supplemental
authority entitled Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991).
OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION OF APPELLEES* SUBMISSION
Brown and Hendricks object to consideration of the described
submission of Appellees on the following grounds:
1.
The Prows case cited in the letter is not a decision
which has only recently come to the attention of Appellees.
Appellees argued in the district court in this action that the
unpublished decision of the Third District Court in the Prows
case was authority to support the position of Appellees. R. at
267, 274.1
1

This was an improper argument at the time since it violated
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration prohibiting
references to unpublished opinions with no precedential value, as
18749.HE624.1
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2.
Counsel for Appellees in this case were also counsel for
the State of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions as
parties in the Prows case. Since the Prows opinion of the Utah
Supreme Court was released in early December of 1991, before the
briefing began in this appeal presently before the Court, the Prows
decision is not a matter which can properly be viewed as having
only recently come to the attention of Appellees or their counsel.
3.
The Prows opinion was cited in Appellants1 Reply Brief
(at p. 12) for the limited purpose of providing background facts
regarding certain aspects of the history of the situation presented
here, only to rebut an unsupported assertion in Appellees' brief.
Appellees had full opportunity to refer to the Prows opinion at
oral argument, but chose not to do so. That decision does not
now entitle Appellees to argue the case in a subsequent written
submission to the Court.
4.
Appellees' complete and presumably intentional failure to
even mention the Prows opinion in their principal brief, shows that
Appellees' counsel recognized then that the Prows opinion has no
application to this case. Not only are the relevant facts in Prows
different and distinguishable from those in the present case, the
legal theories upon which the two cases have proceeded are entirely
different.
5.
To allow Appellees now to have the information in their
letter of February 26, 1993 considered by this Court subverts the
orderly process so carefully prescribed in the Rules of Appellate
Procedure and should not be countenanced.
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY
Should this Court decide to allow consideration of Appellees'
letter of February 26, 1993, notwithstanding the procedural
problems therewith described above, Appellants Brown and Hendricks
respond substantively as follows:
I.

Prows is Distinguishable on Both its Facts and Legal Theories.

As Appellees themselves partially acknowledge and concede in
paragraph 2 of their February 26, 1993 letter, the Prows case is

was then the case.
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readily distinguished from the case at bar.
In Prows, there
apparently was no written contract between the State Department of
Financial Institutions and Mr. Prows and Mr. Wood, the new owners
of Foothill Thrift.
In the present case, Appellants Brown and Hendricks entered
into formal written contracts with both the Department of Financial
Institutions ("DFI") and the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation
("ILGC"). Both contracts were specifically reviewed and approved
by Defendant Weis as Commissioner of the DFI. Both contracts were
premised on a written pro forma projection of the anticipated
future performance of Western Heritage Thrift & Loan ("Western
Heritage") under its new owners. In the Prows opinion, there is
no reference to nor reliance on any such arrangement, which was
missing in that case.
In Prows, the Supreme Court held that the only contract there
alleged, one between Foothill and the ILGC, was not based on any
"bargain" made in that case, since the consideration from each
party was provided only pursuant to statute.
Prows, 822 P.2d
at 767-768.
Further, the contract claim was not made by the
individual plaintiffs, but rather by plaintiff Foothill Federated,
which asserted that the ILGC was obligated only to guarantee
"statutorily mandated levels" of insurance coverage for deposits.
Id. By contrast, the contract claim of Brown and Hendricks does
not seek enforcement of statutory obligations, and is based on a
written agreement between them individually, on the one hand, and
the DFI, on the other.
In Prows, no constitutional or taking claim was alleged and
the Court was not asked to examine the circumstances of any
seizure which may have there occurred. Moreover, any such seizure
occurred, if at all, under circumstances quite different from
those of the present action.
II.

The Brown and Hendricks Contract was Based on Substantial
Consideration, Not Statutory in Nature.

Appellees, in suggesting in point (2) of their letter that the
Brown and Hendricks contract may suffer a statutory consideration
infirmity similar to the entirely different "contract" alleged in
Prows, improperly construe and attempt to misapply the Prows
holding.
In the case at bar, Brown and Hendricks specifically
bargained with the DFI to invest $550,000.00 of new capital and
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personal management services in return for a reasonable opportunity
to make Western Heritage sufficiently profitable so that they might
make back their investment and more. This consideration was not
statutory on either side. Brown and Hendricks were not obligated
by statute to contribute anything to Western Heritage.
Their
decision to do so was induced by the implied promise of the DFI,
inherent in the pro forma and written contract based thereon, to
allow them to manage Western Heritage for a reasonable period of
time.
While Utah statutes gave Commissioner Weis the power to
require the stock of Western Heritage to be transferred away
from its prior owners, which was done in 1984, that statutory power
was exercisable only because Western Heritage's prior owners had
allowed it to become a failing financial institution. This did
not depend on any conduct or consideration which originated with
Brown and Hendricks. The statute did not obligate Commissioner
Weis to transfer that stock to any new investor. She could and
presumably would have kept that stock for the DFI in December
1984 were it not for the new investment of capital, management
experience and effort which Brown and Hendricks brought to the
deal.
This was reflected in Commissioner Weis' requiring the
three-year future financial projections as a basis for the DFI's
willingness to transfer the stock to Brown and Hendricks.
Ill. The State's Taking Order Deprived Brown and Hendricks of any
Legal Basis for Compensation in Liquidation Proceedings.
The theoretical suggestion contained in point (3) of
Appellees' letter of February 26, 1993 is a new argument, raised
on appeal for the first time. It also ignores the fact that the
ex parte taking order depriving Brown and Hendricks of all of their
title to Western Heritage and its assets, leaves no legal basis for
Brown and Hendricks to claim, as former owners, any right to any
residual value which the liquidation proceedings might produce.
Moreover, that taking and divestiture precluded Brown and
Hendricks from any meaningful participation in the management of
the liquidation proceedings. This exclusion makes it less likely
for any excess recovery to be achieved by liquidators who are
less familiar with the thrift's assets. In addition, the State
consolidated the liquidation proceedings of many thrifts in such
a way that any excess produced by Western Heritage goes to pay
depositors of other thrifts, further lessening the likelihood
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that there could ever be any excess available for Brown and
Hendricks, even if they still had the right to seek such payment,
because the other thrifts being liquidated with Western Heritage
by the Appellees were much worse off financially than Western
Heritage. This transfer of "surplus" collections only could be
accomplished because of the taking of title to Western Heritage and
its assets from Brown and Hendricks.
Finally, the premise that underlies the unavailable remedy
suggested by Appellees is that good and profitable management
will be appropriately rewarded through a greater surplus while
inadequate management will be penalized by its inability to
generate a surplus. That premise supports the claims of Brown
and Hendricks.
Brown and Hendricks were recruited to step in and save a
dying institution just moments before it would have otherwise
taken its last breath, they provided new life blood for the thrift
in the form of new capital contributions, were providing the best
care and management possible for their patient, the thrift, and
were significantly ahead of schedule in strengthening it and making
it healthy when Appellees took Western Heritage. Appellees have
misdiagnosed the problem created by Appellees and their proposed
treatment is no cure.
An original plus seven copies hereof are respectfully
submitted this 4th day of March, 1993, and today I have sent a copy
to Mr. Denton M. Hatch, and Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, counsel for
Appellees, by first class mail.
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